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Abstract
What are the welfare gains from being in a currency union? I explore this question
in the context of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with monetary barriers
to trade, local currency pricing and incomplete markets. The model generates a tradeoff
between monetary independence and monetary union. On one hand, distinct national
monetary authorities with separate currencies can address business cycles in a country-
specific way, which is not possible for a single central bank. On the other hand, short-run
violations of the law of one price and long-run losses of international trade occur if different
currencies are adopted, due to the inertia of prices in local currencies and to the presence
of trade frictions. I quantify the welfare gap between these two international monetary
arrangements in consumption equivalents over the lifetime of households, and decompose
it into the contributions of different frictions. I show that the welfare ordering of alterna-
tive currency systems depends crucially on the international correlation of macroeconomic
shocks and on the strength of the monetary barriers affecting trade with separate curren-
cies. I estimate the model on data from Italy, France, Germany and Spain using standard
Bayesian tools, and I find that the tradeoff is resolved in favour of a currency union among
these countries.
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1 Introduction
The fundamental question of the gains and losses from monetary integration has been of
practical importance for decades in Europe1. One aspect of monetary unification that has
attracted particular attention from economists is the issue of how countries can handle id-
iosyncratic disturbances and asymmetric business cycles under a common monetary policy2.
This point is of particular concern to Eurozone members today, as they have surrendered
independent interest-rate and exchange-rate policies and are left with a very limited capacity
to implement countercyclical fiscal policies3.
Since the European Monetary Union (EMU) currently lacks both a formal system of in-
terstate insurance (the so-called fiscal or transfer union) and a full degree of internal labour
mobility—two crucial elements for the viability of a union according to the optimum currency
area theory—its adjustment to macroeconomic shocks is characterised by cross-country het-
erogeneity. The varied pattern of responses to the recent financial crisis is a case in point.
Some Eurozone members have suffered a sharper and longer lasting recession than others:
quarterly data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis show that at the depth of the
recession in the first quarter of 2009 real gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 7.4% in Italy,
13.5% in Spain, 5.7% in France and 6% in Germany. Seven years after the global financial
crisis broke out, output in Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain and Ireland is still below its pre-crisis
level, while this is no longer the case for Germany, as observed by Frankel (2015). Unequal
developments in real economic activity are associated with heterogeneous price dynamics:
according to Eurostat data, the annual inflation rate is 0.9% in Portugal and -1.1% in Spain
as of September 20154, for instance. These differences are problematic from the point of view
of the central monetary authority, because they imply adverse cross-country differentials in
real interest rates in the face of a uniform nominal interest rate at the union level.
In this paper I contribute to the debate on the desirability of currency unions by construct-
ing and estimating a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model that incorporates
different dimensions along which a monetary union might differ from an economy with multiple
currencies. In particular, the model includes three competing effects of monetary unification:
(i) the loss of monetary policy independence caused by the establishment of a unique central
bank; (ii) the elimination of the price misalignments associated with nominal rigidities in local
currencies; (iii) the expansion of trade enabled by the use of a single currency in international
1Corden (1972) and Ingram (1973) are early academic discussions of these themes from a European monetary
integration perspective; they have antecedents in the pathbreaking theoretical contributions by Mundell (1961)
and McKinnon (1963). Several waves of empirical and theoretical research have followed these studies; a recent
review of this literature is Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2010).
2Obstfeld and Peri (1998) and Fatás (1998) are notable contributions to this debate.
3See the remarks by Feldstein (2015) and others at the 2015 AEA Annual Meetings session entitled “When
will the Euro crisis end?”.
4Eurostat measures the annual rate of inflation as the change in the harmonised index of consumer prices
between a given month and the same month of the previous year.
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transactions. I model these effects in a unified framework characterised by international het-
erogeneity and imperfect insurance, and evaluate their importance from the point of view
of social welfare. I estimate my model of a monetary union with data from Italy, France,
Germany and Spain, I evaluate welfare using the utility of households as a criterion, and I
run counterfactual scenarios to assess what welfare would be if these countries had separate
national currencies and independent monetary authorities. I find that these economies enjoy
a higher welfare if they are in a union. I show that this result is given by the features of the
business cycles of these countries and by the strength of the transaction frictions that would
affect trade if they did not use a common currency.
To gain a deeper understanding of the mechanisms that generate this result, let us ex-
amine the three effects above more closely and see how they affect welfare. On one hand,
giving up the ability to set monetary policy at a national level is costly if business cycles are
asynchronous across countries, because separate instruments should be used to stabilise them.
The welfare cost of conducting countercyclical policy with a single instrument is a differential
measure: it does not only depend on the volatility of macroeconomic shocks (which deter-
mines the absolute cost of business cycles), but also on how correlated these shocks are across
countries. For this reason, the cost vanishes if business cycles are perfectly symmetric: in that
case, the economies behave like one and distinct policy instruments are unnecessary. What
makes this welfare cost non-trivial in general is the lack of international risk-sharing and the
presence of nominal and real frictions in the economy. This is the first aspect of monetary
integration I have identified above. On the other hand, the adoption of a single currency has
two advantages. If producers discriminate between countries by setting prices in local cur-
rencies, national currencies are associated with inefficient price differentials across markets.
Introducing a unique currency removes this problem, because it impedes this segmentation
and creates a single market where products are sold at a uniform price. This is the second
consequence of monetary integration I have determined above. On top of this, the use of
a single currency in international commerce eliminates the transaction costs associated with
the presence of multiple currencies, and suppresses a monetary barrier to trade; this improves
consumption permanently. This is the third and last implication I have indicated above.
The net balance of these effects depends on their quantitative importance for welfare. To
assess this, I model them in a fully-optimising setup based on the utility of households. In
contrast with existing microfounded studies that analyse different aspects of monetary unifi-
cation separately5, I bring them together in a unified framework; this allows me to examine
how they interact to generate a tradeoff between alternative currency arrangements, and how
5Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000), Ching and Devereux (2003) and Devereux et al. (2003) are important
studies of the consequences of monetary unification based on microeconomic foundations. They focus on its
welfare implications based on the effects on trade, risk-sharing and price-setting respectively. The first two
works are based on static models, which are not amenable to estimation; the third one uses an infinite-horizon
economy with complete international asset markets and full risk-sharing.
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this tradeoff is resolved. Differently from earlier works on international monetary regimes, I
take a quantitative approach and base my analysis on a model economy whose parameters
are estimated with real-world data.
I cast my analysis in a setup with incomplete markets, local currency pricing and mon-
etary barriers to trade. The backbone of my model is an otherwise standard open economy
New Keynesian framework with nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition in the spirit
of Clarida et al. (2002). It features two ex-ante identical economies that experience idiosyn-
cratic technology, preference, labour supply and monetary shocks; the problem of ex-post
heterogeneity is made explicit through the examination of how welfare is affected by the in-
ternational comovement of these disturbances. The mechanisms at work in the model have
antecedents in the two-region representations of monetary unions by Benigno (2004), Beetsma
and Jensen (2005) and Ferrero (2009)6. However, while these works consider model economies
where union members fully share risk—either via complete asset markets or by specific param-
eterisations of the elasticities of substitution that guarantee endogenous risk-sharing through
the terms of trade—I study an environment where international risk-sharing is incomplete7.
One of the most relevant components of my model economy is its asset structure, which
follows the characterisation of Benigno (2009). Markets are complete at the level of individual
countries, but international trade in financial assets is limited to nominally risk-free bonds.
This guarantees that the model has a simple representative agent formulation, while depar-
tures from full international risk-sharing occur over the business cycle. Unlike Benigno (2009),
I compare and rank two different international monetary arrangements. In the first one, sep-
arate national currencies exist and monetary policy is controlled by two distinct authorities;
these set nominal interest rates on an independent basis, following Taylor-type instrument
rules based on country-specific targets. In the second one, a single currency is present and
monetary policy is set by one central bank for the whole union, in accordance with a Taylor
rule that depends on union-wide objectives. I model both regimes in a cashless economy.
Another important component of the model is the type of price-setting frictions it has.
Nominal rigidities are combined with local currency pricing (LCP) à la Engel (2011) or
Corsetti et al. (2011): firms set prices in the buyers’ currency, and pricing opportunities
arrive at random intervals following a conventional Calvo-Yun scheme. In the presence of
separate national currencies, domestic and foreign buyers are charged two distinct prices for
identical goods; these satisfy the law of one price in the long run, but violate it over the
business cycle, causing a misallocation of resources. If a monetary union is in place, instead,
6Galí and Monacelli (2005) and Forlati (2009) are alternative perspectives where the union is modelled as
a continuum of small-open economies.
7A recent examination of the monetary aspects of currency unions with imperfect insurance and hetero-
geneity is Bhattarai et al. (2015), which draws on the setup laid out by Cúrdia and Woodford (2010). While
that work takes the international currency arrangement (i.e. the union) as given and searches for the optimal
monetary policy in that environment, I compare the performance of different monetary systems under given,
price stability-oriented policies.
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the price is unique and the law of one price applies continuously8.
The last key component of the model is the real structure of the economy. This features
full specialisation in production on the part of the two countries (with a standard two-stage
manufacturing process in each place) and frictional international trade. The barrier to com-
merce has a monetary nature, and it only exists in the regime with two currencies; it takes
the form of a Lama and Rabanal (2014)9 type linear “iceberg” shipping cost on imported
products. I use this reduced-form feature as a stand-in for the various transaction costs that
affect the international exchange of goods when multiple currencies are adopted, as docu-
mented empirically by Rose (2000) and Rose and van Wincoop (2001), among others. The
effect of this friction is a long-run trade and consumption differential between the union and
the monetary independence regime.
In order to quantify the importance of these frictions for social welfare, I follow Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2007) and define welfare as the expectation of households’ lifetime utility,
conditional on the initial state of the economy being the nonstochastic steady state. To assess
the relative performance of alternative currency systems, I measure the welfare differential
in terms of consumption equivalents; that is, I define the welfare gap as the loss of lifetime
consumption that makes households under monetary independence as happy as they would
be under a union. A distinctive feature of my work is that I explicitly decompose this gap into
the contribution of different frictions, paying special attention to the role of the international
correlation of macroeconomic disturbances, or the lack thereof.
My examination of the welfare gap between monetary independence and union starts from
a calibrated economy with frictionless trade, producer currency pricing (PCP) and uncertainty
only from idiosyncratic technology shocks; it then proceeds with the introduction of one addi-
tional friction at a time. I first use the simplified economy to show that inflation and output
are more volatile in a monetary union than they are under separate national currencies. I
argue that this difference has fundamental welfare implications, and show that the welfare
differential between the two regimes vanishes as shocks get perfectly correlated. I then in-
troduce price discrimination back into the model, and show that the inertia of local-currency
prices determines inefficient international price misalignments in the face of exchange rate
movements. I argue that this friction per se does not alter the welfare ordering of the two
regimes, because it leaves the steady state of the economy unaffected and only bites in the
short run. Finally, I add trade frictions to the picture, and explain that they reduce imports
8Engel (2014) revises the main results from the literature on alternative export-pricing specifications and
their impact on macroeconomic adjustment and exchange-rate stabilisation. The implications of LCP with
sticky prices were first explored in a welfare-based model of monetary policy by Devereux and Engel (2003).
9Lama and Rabanal (2014) is a recent attempt to explore the currency area question explicitly from the
perspective of monetary policy. The authors use an estimated two-country DSGE model to evaluate the welfare
implications of unifying the United Kingdom and the Eurozone under a single currency. Their work is a close
relative to mine from a methodological point of view, but it has an emphasis on financial stability issues and
unconventional monetary policy measures.
5
demand and depress output at all horizons. I argue that this distortion reduces consumption
and welfare in the economy with multiple currencies in the long run; this opens up the pos-
sibility that households experience a higher welfare with a single currency. The issue of the
net balance between competing forces then becomes an empirical one.
My estimation strategy is as follows. I estimate the full-fledged model in its single-currency
configuration with quarterly data from Italy, France, Germany and Spain; the estimation is
performed on two countries at a time. For each pair, I compute welfare in the monetary
union regime and then compare it with a counterfactual scenario where the two countries split
and adopt national currencies, keeping identical Taylor rules but basing them on domestic
objectives rather than common ones. I carry out the calculation under a calibration of the
trade friction in line with Lama and Rabanal (2014), and then study the sensitivity of my
results to this specific choice. Adopting standard Bayesian techniques, I find that the welfare
gain from monetary integration is positive for these economies: its posterior mean is above
2% of lifetime consumption in all cases. The gain is largest for Italy and France, which appear
to have the most correlated shocks, and is smallest for Spain and Germany.
I conclude with the perspective that a system of separate national currencies would be
desirable if monetary barriers to trade were very small or entirely absent, because in that case
there would be little or no trade gain from establishing a currency union. Based on numerical
work, I show that a moderate amount of trade frictions is sufficient for the monetary union
to guarantee the highest social welfare in the present setup. I attribute this result to the
modest cost of business cycle asymmetries for the economies under scrutiny, and argue that
the domain of applicability of a single currency could be affected significantly by the addition
of further frictions that introduce cross-country heterogeneity along new dimensions.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the setup and illustrates its
main dynamic properties. Section 3 defines a welfare measure to compare different monetary
arrangements, and explores the dependence of the ranking upon the shocks and frictions of
the model. Section 4 presents the Bayesian estimation and discusses the results. Section 5
concludes.
2 Monetary independence and union in a two-country model
This section is divided in two parts. In the first part, I present the optimisation-based setup
that I use to assess the welfare benefits of a single currency. In the second part, I employ a
simplified version of the model to illustrate how macroeconomic adjustment to asymmetric
technology shocks differs across alternative currency arrangements.
I base my analysis on a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model where the world
is made up of two countries, h and f , each populated by a continuum of measure one of
households with identical preferences. Employing the modeling strategy of Benigno (2009), I
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assume that households can perfectly pool risks within their respective countries through a full
set of state-contingent securities traded locally, but international trade in assets is limited to
noncontingent bonds10. This asset markets structure is invariant to the international currency
arrangement.
I consider two alternative international monetary regimes. In the first regime, called
“monetary union”, the two countries share a single currency and monetary policy is controlled
by a unique central bank; the bank follows a conventional interest rate rule based on union-
wide inflation and output objectives. In the second regime, named “monetary independence”,
the countries have separate national currencies and distinct monetary authorities; these follow
analogous but independent interest rate rules that depend on country-specific policy targets.
The economy is cashless, so monetary policy involves the direct control of nominal interest
rates; central banks perform this task by choosing the price of nominal bonds with one-period
maturity.
Each country specialises in the supply of one good, whose production takes place in two
steps. First, monopolistically competitive firms produce a continuum of differentiated goods;
price-setting is subject to Calvo-Yun nominal rigidities. Second, perfectly competitive firms
aggregate locally-produced intermediates into final consumption goods, which are traded in-
ternationally. Within each country, firms are owned by the domestic households.
If different currencies exist, goods are priced in the currency of their destination market;
that is, firms engage in Engel (2011) type local currency pricing, which implies that nominal
exchange rate movements determine short-run international price misalignments. With a
single currency, goods are uniformly priced across the union.
The international exchange of goods is affected by frictions in the regime with separate
national currencies, but is free under a monetary union. I model these frictions as “iceberg”
shipping costs that cause a fraction of imported goods to be lost in transit between the two
countries. This feature is a stand-in for the monetary barriers to trade documented by Rose
(2000) and Rose and van Wincoop (2001). The permanent trade gains offered by the elimi-
nation of this friction represent the key advantage of a currency union over a multicurrency
system in my framework.
In the exposition that follows, I focus on the model with two currencies, which displays
the richest notation. The differences with the monetary union are pointed out along the way.
2.1 The model
2.1.1 Households
Households make consumption, saving and labour supply decisions. They consume a bundle
of domestic and foreign goods, competitively supply indifferentiated labour services to local
10To save on notation, I keep the Arrow securities implicit and restrict attention to the representative agents.
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producers (whose profits they receive in a lump-sum fashion) and invest in nominally risk-
free, one-period pure discount bonds. Households have access to both domestic currency-
denominated and foreign currency-denominated bonds, so international borrowing and lending
can take place in either currency.
Intertemporal optimisation The representative households of the home and foreign coun-
try solve the following dynamic problems:
max
{ct,At+1,Bt+1,nt}
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtξt
(
c1−σt
1− σ − φt
n1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
)
s.t. ct + qAt
At+1
pt
+ etqBt
Bt+1
pt
+ χqBt
(
etBt+1
pt
)2
= At
pt
+ et
Bt
pt
+ wt
pt
nt +
ph,t
pt
Πh,t +
Tt
pt
and
max
{c∗t ,A∗t+1,B∗t+1,n∗t }
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtξ∗t
(
(c∗t )1−σ
1− σ − φ
∗
t
(n∗t )1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
)
s.t. c∗t +
qAt
et
A∗t+1
p∗t
+ qBt
B∗t+1
p∗t
+ χqAt
(
A∗t+1
etp∗t
)2
= A
∗
t
etp∗t
+ B
∗
t
p∗t
+ w
∗
t
p∗t
n∗t +
p∗f,t
p∗t
Πf,t +
T ∗t
p∗t
.
ξt and ξ∗t are intertemporal preference shocks, while φt and φ∗t are labour supply shocks. At
and A∗t represent each household’s holdings of the home currency-denominated asset, while
Bt and B∗t are their respective holdings of the foreign currency-denominated asset. et is the
nominal exchange rate. Real bond holdings are subject to quadratic costs à la Benigno (2009);
these pin down equilibrium portfolios and ensure that bond positions revert to zero in the long
run. The costs paid by each household are received by the other through lump-sum transfers,
so they do not represent a deadweight loss:
Tt
pt
=
(
etp
∗
t
pt
)
χqAt
(
A∗t+1
etp∗t
)2
,
T ∗t
p∗t
=
(
pt
etp∗t
)
χqBt
(
etBt+1
pt
)2
.
The optimality conditions for consumption, saving and labour supply are spelt out in the
Appendix.
Intratemporal optimisation Households have utility over consumption of a composite
index of domestic and foreign goods, with an imports share parameter ζ and a constant
elasticity of substitution η. Their static optimisation problems are respectively
max
ch,t,cf,t
ct ≡
[
(1− ζ) 1η (ch,t)
η−1
η + (ζ)
1
η ((1− τ) cf,t)
η−1
η
] η
η−1
s.t. ptct = ph,tch,t + pf,tcf,t
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and
max
c∗
h,t
,c∗
f,t
c∗t ≡
[
(1− ζ) 1η
(
c∗f,t
) η−1
η + (ζ)
1
η
(
(1− τ) c∗h,t
) η−1
η
] η
η−1
s.t. p∗t c∗t = p∗f,tc∗f,t + p∗h,tc∗h,t,
where ph,t, pf,t, p∗h,t and p∗f,t represent the producer prices of home and foreign goods in each
currency. This distinction becomes superfluous with a single currency: in that case, prices
are just ph,t and pf,t.
A fraction τ of the imported goods are actually lost and do not yield utility. These “iceberg
costs” à la Lama and Rabanal (2014) represent frictions associated with the use of different
currencies in international commerce; they are null by definition in a currency union.
The effective consumer price indices (CPIs) are respectively
pt ≡
[
(1− ζ) (ph,t)1−η + (ζ)
(
pf,t
1− τ
)1−η] 11−η
and
p∗t ≡
(1− ζ) (p∗f,t)1−η + (ζ)
(
p∗h,t
1− τ
)1−η 11−η .
The real exchange rate is defined as
Qt ≡ etp
∗
t
pt
.
The consumption demands associated with these prices are
ch,t = (1− ζ)
(
ph,t
pt
)−η
ct, cf,t = (ζ) (1− τ)η−1
(
pf,t
pt
)−η
ct,
c∗f,t = (1− ζ)
(
p∗f,t
p∗t
)−η
c∗t , c
∗
h,t = (ζ) (1− τ)η−1
(
p∗h,t
p∗t
)−η
c∗t .
2.1.2 Firms
The production of consumer goods takes place in two steps. First, imperfectly competitive
firms produce a continuum of measure one of intermediate goods in each country, using
technologies that take local labour as their only input. The prices of these goods are set
in terms of the currency of the country where they are sold. Second, perfectly competitive
firms aggregate intermediates into final products, which are either consumed domestically or
exported. I describe each group of producers in the h country; f -country firms have a similar
behaviour.
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Final goods producers Perfectly competitive producers adopt a constant elasticity of sub-
stitution (CES) technology that takes as inputs all varieties of locally-produced intermediates
and outputs homogeneous final products. Varieties are indexed by i. Separate sets of firms
serve the domestic and the foreign market; as they adopt the same technology, the products
they make are in fact identical.
The problems faced by the producers of home goods that serve each market are respectively
max
yh,t(i)
ph,tyh,t −
ˆ 1
0
ph,t (i) yh,t (i) di s.t. yh,t =
[ˆ 1
0
yh,t (i)
ε−1
ε di
] ε
ε−1
,
max
y∗
h,t
(i)
p∗h,ty
∗
h,t −
ˆ 1
0
p∗h,t (i) y∗h,t (i) di s.t. y∗h,t =
[ˆ 1
0
y∗h,t (i)
ε−1
ε di
] ε
ε−1
.
The input demands by these producers are
yh,t (i) =
(
ph,t (i)
ph,t
)−ε
yh,t, y
∗
h,t (i) =
(
p∗h,t (i)
p∗h,t
)−ε
y∗h,t,
with associated producer price indices (PPIs)
ph,t =
(ˆ 1
0
ph,t (i)1−ε di
) 1
1−ε
, p∗h,t =
(ˆ 1
0
p∗h,t (i)1−ε di
) 1
1−ε
.
The distinction between exported and domestically-consumed final goods fades in the mone-
tary union, since the underlying intermediate goods are priced in the same currency; in that
case, the aggregator function y∗h,t is redundant.
Intermediate goods producers Monopolistically competitive firms hire local labour in
each country to produce differentiated intermediate goods i with the following technologies:
yt (i) = ztnt (i) .
zt and z∗t denote their respective productivities. The quantities produced must satisfy both
domestic and foreign demand:
yt (i) = yh,t (i) + y∗h,t (i) .
Firms face an exogenous probability 1 − θp of resetting their prices each period. Prices are
chosen to maximise discounted profits, subject to isoelastic demand schedules by the producers
of final goods. Given the prices, output is demand-determined.
In the presence of two different currencies, firms set a distinct price for each market. The
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optimal pricing problem faced by producers in the home country is
max
p¯h,t (i) , p¯∗h,t (i)
Et
∞∑
τ=0
θτpΛt,t+τ
{
p¯h,t (i)
ph,t+τ
yh,t+τ (i) + et+τ
p¯∗h,t (i)
ph,t+τ
y∗h,t+τ (i)−Ψ (yt+τ (i))
}
s.t.

yh,t+τ (i) =
(
ph,t+τ (i)
ph,t+τ
)−ε
yh,t+τ
y∗h,t+τ (i) =
(
p∗h,t+τ (i)
p∗
h,t+τ
)−ε
y∗h,t+τ ,
where Λt,t+τ represents the household’s stochastic discount factor for τ periods-ahead real
payoffs, while the Ψ (·) function is the total real cost of production. The optimal price-setting
conditions for the goods that are aimed at the domestic market read
g2h,t =Mpg1h,t,
g2h,t ≡ Et
∞∑
τ=0
(θpβ)τ
(
λt+τ
λt
)yh,t+τ
(
p¯h,t
ph,t
)−ε( 1∏τ
s=1 pih,t+s
)1−ε ,
g1h,t ≡ Et
∞∑
τ=0
(θpβ)τ
(
λt+τ
λt
)yh,t+τmct+τdt+τ
(
p¯h,t
ph,t
)−1−ε( 1∏τ
s=1 pih,t+s
)−ε ,
where the desired frictionless markup is defined as
Mp ≡ ε
ε− 1 .
Analogous conditions hold for the goods that are aimed at the export market, as shown in
the Appendix; they imply that nominal rigidities and price discrimination interact to cause
violations of the law of one price over the business cycle. It should be noted that the law
of one price holds in the nonstochastic steady state, because firms enjoy the same degree of
monopoly power on both markets, so they charge the same markup in the long run.
In the presence of a single currency, instead, price setters choose a unique price for both
markets and the law of one price holds continuously.
2.1.3 Monetary policy
Two different monetary regimes are considered here. In the first, two different currencies exist
and the nominal exchange rate is flexible. In the second, only one currency exists.
Monetary independence The national central banks of the two countries control the
prices of the bonds denominated in the respective currencies. They set nominal interest rates
according to the following rules:
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Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)γR [(pit
pi
)γpi ( yt
yt−1
)γy ( et
et−1
)γe]1−γR
mt, (1)
R∗t
R∗
=
(
R∗t−1
R∗
)γR [(pi∗t
pi∗
)γpi ( y∗t
y∗t−1
)γy (
et−1
et
)γe]1−γR
m∗t , (2)
where Rt = 1/qAt and R∗t = 1/qBt . The mt and m∗t terms represent exogenous interest rate
shocks. Since firms engage in LCP, monetary authorities target CPI inflation rates:
pit ≡ pt
pt−1
, pi∗t ≡
p∗t
p∗t−1
.
Taylor rules are specified in terms of real output growth, because the output gap is not ob-
servable in practice. They also feature an exchange rate feedback term that prevents nominal
exchange rate movements from causing excessive price misalignments and large violations of
the risk-sharing condition11
λ∗t
λt
= etp
∗
t
pt
.
Monetary union The central bank of the monetary union adopts a Taylor rule that takes
union-wide measures as monetary policy targets:
Rut
Ru
=
(
Rut−1
Ru
)γR [(piu,t
piu
)γpi ( yu,t
yu,t−1
)γy]1−γR
mut . (3)
Union-wide output is the sum of the two countries’ GDPs:
yu,t = yt + y∗t .
Inflation in the union is defined as the geometric average of the two GDP inflation rates
pih,t ≡ ph,t
ph,t−1
, pif,t ≡ pf,t
pf,t−1
,
weighted by the sizes of the respective countries:
piu,t ≡ pu,t
pu,t−1
= (pih,t)
1
2 (pif,t)
1
2 .
11Due to the incompleteness of markets, the decentralised equilibrium allocation is inefficient and is supported
by suboptimal patterns of international borrowing and lending. This inefficiency also shows up in the form of
excess nominal exchange rate volatility, which creates scope for welfare-improving monetary policy intervention.
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An endogenous nominal interest rate spread must correct self-fulfilling inflation differentials
between the two countries under rule (3), in order to rule out unstable solutions:
Ωt ≡ R
∗
t
Rt
=
(
pif,t
pih,t
)ω
,
where ω ' 0.
2.1.4 Exogenous processes
Shocks are common to all households and firms within each country, and follow first-order
autoregressive processes in logs. The international spillovers of these shocks are controlled by
the parameters ν. Intertemporal preference shocks:
[
log ξt
log ξ∗t
]
=
[
ρξ νξ
νξ ρξ
] [
log ξt−1
log ξ∗t−1
]
+
[
eξ,t
e∗ξ,t
]
.
Labour supply shocks:
[
log φt
log φ∗t
]
=
[
ρφ νφ
νφ ρφ
] [
log φt−1
log φ∗t−1
]
+
[
eφ,t
e∗φ,t
]
.
Technology shocks:
[
log zt
log z∗t
]
=
[
ρz νz
νz ρz
] [
log zt−1
log z∗t−1
]
+
[
ez,t
e∗z,t
]
.
Monetary shocks with two currencies:
[
logmt
logm∗t
]
=
[
ρm νm
νm ρm
] [
logmt−1
logm∗t−1
]
+
[
em,t
e∗m,t
]
.
Monetary shocks with a single currency:
logmut = ρm logmut−1 + eum,t.
The innovations follow i.i.d. normal processes, which may or may not be correlated across
countries.
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2.1.5 Market clearing, price dispersion and output
The GDP of each country is the sum of the goods produced for the domestic market and
those intended for exports:
yt = yh,t + y∗h,t, y∗t = yf,t + y∗f,t.
The market clearing conditions for these goods are
yh,t = ch,t, y∗h,t = (1− τ) c∗h,t + τc∗h,t,
y∗f,t = c∗f,t, yf,t = (1− τ) cf,t + τcf,t.
The labour market clearing conditions are
nt =
ˆ 1
0
nt (i) di, n∗t =
ˆ 1
0
n∗t (i) di.
They can be combined with the demand schedules and the production technologies of indi-
vidual goods, to yield the exact aggregate production functions of each economy:
yt =
ztnt
dt
, y∗t =
z∗t n∗t
d∗t
. (4)
The state variables dt and d∗t measure price dispersion at the level of GDP. They are weighted
combinations of the price dispersion indices at the PPI level:
dt ≡ xh,tdh,t + x∗h,td∗h,t, d∗t ≡ xf,tdf,t + x∗f,td∗f,t.
The weights equal the shares of domestically-consumed and exported output:
xh,t ≡ yh,t
yt
, x∗h,t ≡
y∗h,t
yt
, xf,t ≡ yf,t
y∗t
, x∗f,t ≡
y∗f,t
y∗t
.
The four indices of price dispersion at PPI level are defined as
dh,t ≡
ˆ 1
0
(
ph,t (i)
ph,t
)−ε
di, d∗h,t ≡
ˆ 1
0
(
p∗h,t (i)
p∗h,t
)−ε
di,
df,t ≡
ˆ 1
0
(
pf,t (i)
pf,t
)−ε
di, d∗f,t ≡
ˆ 1
0
(
p∗f,t (i)
p∗f,t
)−ε
di.
Finally, the following market clearing conditions apply to the internationally-traded assets:
At+1 = −A∗t+1, Bt+1 = −B∗t+1.
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The laws of motion of the price dispersion indices, the aggregate price levels and the nominal
exchange rate are displayed in the Appendix.
2.2 Equilibrium adjustment to asymmetric shocks
Before moving on to analyse welfare under alternative international monetary arrangements,
I use a simplified version of my model to shed light on how macroeconomic adjustment in a
currency union differs from that with two independent monetary policies.
I shut down the disturbances to intertemporal preferences, labour supply and interest
rates, and consider an environment where technology shocks represent the only source of
uncertainty. I assume that trade is frictionless, so that consumption and output are identical
across monetary regimes in the long run. Furthermore, I assume that firms engage in producer
currency pricing, so that the law of one price applies: ph,t = etp∗h,t and pf,t = etp∗f,t at all
times.
Table 4 in the Appendix displays the calibrated parameters. The time interval of the
model is meant to be a quarter. I specify identical preferences with unit intertemporal and
intratemporal elasticities of substitution. This configuration is known as “macroeconomic
independence”, because it implies that domestic and foreign goods are neither complements
nor substitutes in consumption; this rules out international supply spillovers. As to the
monetary policy block, I calibrate the Taylor rules with identical coefficients across the two
monetary regimes to ease the comparison12.
Let us explore the effects of a positive productivity shock to the home country, under the
assumption that this is uncorrelated with foreign productivity. Figure 1 shows that inflation
and output are more volatile in the regime with two currencies (solid blue lines) than they are
in the regime with a single currency (dashed purple lines), because asymmetric disturbances
cannot be addressed selectively under the former arrangement.
Notice that a positive international comovement of output appears in Figure 1, despite the
unit elasticities of substitution specified in Table 4. This occurs in both monetary regimes,
and is due to the response of monetary policy to the shock.
Under rules (1) and (2), the central bank of the home country responds to the deflationary
effects of a positive technology shock by cutting the nominal interest rate. To avoid an
excessive movement of the nominal exchange rate, the foreign central bank cuts its interest
rate too. This is what causes a jump of foreign inflation and output.
Under rule (3), the central bank reacts to a local productivity improvement by cutting
the nominal interest rate for the whole union; this stimulates foreign activity and inflation.
12Interest rate smoothing is muted because there is no need to stabilise the opportunity cost of holding
money in a cashless economy. Similarly, the response to output fluctuations is muted in the absence of
inefficient cost-push shocks. The inflation and exchange rate coefficients are choosen to guarantee a unique
rational expectations equilibrium.
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Both variables are significantly more volatile than in the other regime.
In fact, the distance between the impulse responses in the two regimes depends on the
symmetry of the shocks. If zt and z∗t were perfectly positively correlated, the impulse responses
would coincide. Conversely, if they were perfectly negatively correlated, the impulse responses
would be farther apart. The next section explores the consequences of this for social welfare.
Figure 1: Impulse responses to a technology shock: monetary independence vs currency union
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3 Welfare differential between international monetary regimes
I now introduce a welfare metric that allows me to rank alternative monetary regimes.
Following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007), I define welfare as the conditional expectation
of lifetime utility as of time zero, assuming that at this point all state variables equal their
steady-state values. The welfare levels associated with monetary independence and currency
union are respectively
V mi0 ≡ E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu
(
cmit , n
mi
t
)
, V cu0 ≡ E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (ccut , ncut ) ,
where
{
cmit
}
,
{
nmit
}
, {ccut } and {ncut } represent the respective contingent plans for consump-
tion and hours. The welfare cost of abandoning an independent monetary policy and adopting
a single currency is measured in terms of foregone consumption: I define it as the negative
subsidy rate λ such that
V cu0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu
(
(1− λ) cmit , nmit
)
.
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The welfare gap between these monetary arrangements can be written as
V cu0 − V mi0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
u
(
(1− λ) cmit , nmit
)
− u
(
cmit , n
mi
t
)]
.
With logarithmic utility, the welfare cost amounts to
λ = 1− e(1−β)(V cu0 −Vmi0 ). (5)
3.1 Computational method
Due to the frictions that affect the goods and the asset markets, the steady state of the
model is inefficient. In order to measure welfare accurately in this setup, I approximate the
equilibrium conditions up to second-order13. My numerical strategy is based on perturbation,
which represents a convenient approach for studying economies with a large number of state
variables. The algorithm that I use is Dynare by Adjemian et al. (2011). To address the
problem of explosive paths emerging in second-order approximations of this class of models14,
I apply a pruning method due to Kim et al. (2008).
3.2 Shocks, frictions and welfare
In this section, I examine the main determinants of the welfare gap between alternative mon-
etary arrangements. I start from an economy with no trade costs nor international price
discrimination; I then introduce these frictions one at a time, and discuss their welfare impli-
cations. I focus on an environment where technology shocks are the only source of uncertainty.
Figure 2 plots the welfare gap against the correlation of technology shocks, in an economy
where the law of one price holds continuously and international trade is frictionless. The
relationship is negative because a stronger comovement of macroeconomic variables reduces
the degree of ex-post heterogeneity among countries; this decreases the need for region-specific
stabilisation policies and the attractiveness of a multicurrency system. The gap goes to zero as
corr (ez, e∗z) approaches one, because in that case the two economies become identical ex-post
and there is no difference between having one or two instruments of monetary policy.
The slope of the welfare gap line depends on the volatility of the exogenous processes.
Stronger shocks make the two countries more heterogeneous ex-post, widening the difference
13This is needed because first-order methods leave out welfare-relevant terms and incur large approximation
errors when the steady state of the economy Pareto-inefficient, as documented by Kim and Kim (2003).
14Higher-order terms of state variables tend to appear in the application of second-order methods without
pruning. These terms create “spurious” steady states that are extraneous to the original model; this is prob-
lematic because the resulting approximated state-space system is unstable around these points usually, and
does not have finite moments. Pruning procedures remove the higher-order terms and preserve only first and
second-order terms when the system is iterated forward: the alternative state-space system constructed by
these methods achieves stability.
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between the welfare achievable with two monetary policy instruments and that achievable
with one. This effect is proportional to the correlation of productivity disturbances, so it is
reflected in a steeper line.
The intercept of the welfare gap line depends on the other macroeconomic disturbances
that exist in the economy. The fact that the welfare cost of a monetary union is null when
technology shocks are perfectly correlated (as reflected by a zero right intercept in Figure
2) is due to the fact that I have shut down the shocks to intertemporal preferences, labour
supply and interest rates. If these disturbances were present, the two economies would be
heterogeneous even when corr (ez, e∗z) = 1, and the right intercept of the welfare gap schedule
would be positive15.
Figure 2: Correlation of technology shocks and the welfare cost of a currency union
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Figure 3 shows what happens when we introduce pricing-to-market. The pass-through
of nominal exchange rate movements into import prices becomes imperfect when prices are
subject to staggered setting in the currency of the destination market. In the short run,
identical products are sold at different prices in different places, once converted into a common
unit of account. This is inefficient, because it distorts the allocation of demand. The following
measures of international price misalignments quantify the departures from the law of one
price:
mh,t ≡
etp
∗
h,t
ph,t
, mf,t ≡
etp
∗
f,t
pf,t
.
If nominal rigidities are strong enough, these frictions add an important cost to the regime with
national currencies. The monetary union is not affected by these frictions instead, because the
presence of a single currency removes the segmentation of final goods markets and impedes
price discrimination: goods are uniformly priced across countries. For this reason, the welfare
gap between the two regimes shrinks. Since price misalignments materialise over the business
cycle and are null in the nonstochastic steady state, the reduction is proportional to the
15The right intercept would still be zero if all other disturbances were perfectly positively correlated too.
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correlation of technology shocks; this is why it affects the slope of the welfare gap schedule.
Figure 3: Price discrimination and the welfare cost of a currency union
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Figure 4 illustrates the welfare effect of trade frictions. The presence of monetary barriers
to trade reduces the demand for imports, lowering the long-run output level of the economy
with multiple currencies relative to that of the union; since this distortion affects the steady
state of the economy, it shifts down the entire welfare gap schedule. This affects the welfare
ranking between alternative monetary regimes significantly, because it creates regions where
the union Pareto-dominates the system of independent national currencies.
Figure 4: Trade frictions and the welfare cost of a currency union
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As the position of the welfare gap schedule is closely tied to the quantitative strength of
the various shocks and frictions, it is difficult to draw conclusions from the present model
without letting the data discipline its parameters. This is what I do in the next section.
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4 Bayesian estimation
In this section, the model meets quarterly data from Italy, France, Germany and Spain to be
estimated and evaluated using Bayesian tools. In accordance with the structure of the model,
the estimations and the subsequent welfare calculations are done on two countries at a time.
My empirical strategy is as follows. I estimate the model in its monetary union configura-
tion, and then calculate the welfare gap with the multicurrency regime under the assumption
that the estimated parameters are invariant to the monetary arrangement16. I assume that
countries keep identical Taylor rules in the monetary independence regime, but base them on
individual (rather than union-wide) policy objectives.
4.1 Data
The beginning of the sample is chosen to coincide with the official launch of the Euro in the
first quarter of 1999. The end of the sample is the fourth quarter of 2014.
As the model features seven exogenous driving processes, I use seven macroeconomic series
as observables: the real GDP, real consumption and CPI inflation series of each country, plus
the nominal interest rate of the union (as measured by the Eurozone interbank rate).
The CPI inflation data are obtained from OECD; the source of the remaining series is the
FRED archive of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The series are seasonally adjusted.
Output and consumption are divided by the GDP deflator, so that they appear in real
terms. The series are then turned into per capita terms using population data from Euro-
stat17. Finally, they are detrended by means of a one-sided Hodrick and Prescott filter18 with
smoothing parameter 1600.
4.2 Calibrated parameters and priors
I calibrate three sets of parameters: (i) those that have been consistently identified by the
literature (e.g. the Calvo parameter on prices), (ii) those that would not be identified from
the vector of observable variables chosen here (e.g. the trade cost parameter), and (iii) those
that represent simplifying assumptions (e.g. the unit elasticities of intertemporal and trade
substitution). These are listed in Table 5 in the Appendix.
16The alternative strategy of separately estimating the model under flexible exchange rates is hindered by
data availability issues. The exchange rates of the largest European economies were controlled long before the
Euro was established in 1999: a system of semi-pegged exchange rates known as the European Exchange Rate
Mechanism was in place from 1979 to 1999. The availability of suitable pre-1979 quarterly data is limited.
17Since the frequency of the original population data is annual, I construct population series at quarterly
frequency by interpolation.
18The traditional two-sided HP filter takes future values of variables as an input to construct data series.
This contradicts the backward-looking structure of the model in state-space form, where the solution today
depends only on current and past states.
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I estimate two sets of parameters: (i) the Taylor rule coefficients and (ii) the parameters
that control the exogenous processes. The priors that I specify before launching the estimation
are collected in Table 6 in the Appendix.
Three parameters are specific to the model with national currencies: they are the trade
friction parameter, the international correlation of monetary shocks and the exchange rate
coefficient in the Taylor rules. They have no counterpart in the union. I set τ = 0.05 following
Lama and Rabanal (2014)19, I specify corr (em, e∗m) = 0, and I fix γe at the lowest value that
guarantees a unique rational expectations equilibrium. I subsequently check the robustness
of my results to changes in these parameters.
4.3 Estimation technique
I construct a first-order approximation of the model and its decision rules, so that the likeli-
hood can be generated by Kalman filter projections from the approximated state-space system.
This choice is dictated by computational convenience20.
As the posterior distribution cannot be evaluated analytically, I adopt a standard Metropolis-
Hastings (MH) Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm to simulate it and produce Bayesian
estimates of the parameters. For each round of estimation, I run four parallel chains of the
MH algorithm with 500,000 replications each. I set a 50% burn-in period to remove the de-
pendence of the estimates on the parameter vector that initialises the MH algorithm, so the
first 250,000 draws are discarded before actually using the posterior simulations. Tables 7
and 8 in the Appendix summarise the results. Tables 9 to 14 report the contribution of each
shock to the variance of the observables at infinite horizon.
4.4 Welfare results
To evaluate the distribution of the welfare gap λ for each pair of countries, I employ the fol-
lowing procedure: (i) I take a sample of 1000 parameter draws from the appropriate posterior
distribution, (ii) I simulate the model in both monetary configurations and compute welfare
for each of these parameter vectors, and (iii) I calculate the gap in consumption equivalents
using equation (5). Table 1 reports the results. The probability densities are displayed in
Figure 6 in the Appendix.
19These authors indicate 5 percentage points as a lower bound on the true reduction in transaction costs
produced by the introduction of a single currency. This calibration allows me to get a conservative assessment
of the gains from monetary unification.
20In principle, the construction of the likelihood from a second-order approximation would exploit the non-
linear structure of the model more fully. In practice, the use of a particle filter can be computationally
expensive, whereas the difference in terms of point estimates is likely to be small; see Fernández-Villaverde
and Rubio-Ramírez (2005).
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Table 1: Estimates of λ
Country pair Mean 90% HPD interval
Italy and France -2.55% [-2.56%, -2.54%]
Italy and Germany -2.44% [-2.57%, -2.33%]
Italy and Spain -2.52% [-2.67%, -2.41%]
France and Germany -2.42% [-2.50%, -2.33%]
France and Spain -2.52% [-2.63%, -2.44%]
Spain and Germany -2.33% [-2.43%, -2.24%]
The negative signs on all lambdas mean that all pairs of countries under scrutiny enjoy
welfare gains from sharing a common currency, in this framework. The distributions show
little dispersion: the highest posterior density (HPD) intervals at a 90% credibility level are
quite tight around their means.
The countries who appear to gain the most from being in a monetary union are Italy and
France, while those who seem to gain the least are Germany and Spain. This is consistent
with the estimated correlations of shocks displayed in Tables 7 and 8—particularly those
to technology, in the light of the fact that they are responsible for most of the variance of
consumption and output in this environment.
4.5 Discussion
The results above are specific to the configuration chosen for the non-estimated parameters.
Among these, the three parameters that are unobservable in a monetary union deserve further
discussion; even though they do not affect the likelihood of the estimated model, they have
an impact on welfare in the economy with national currencies.
To examine the sensitivity of welfare to γe, corr (em, e∗m) and τ , I let these parameters vary
and I keep the others fixed at their respective posterior means. I find that the first and the
second parameter have a negligible impact on the welfare gap21, while the third is of primary
importance.
Figure 5 plots the welfare gap between alternative regimes against the intensity of trade
frictions. The relationship is negative for all the countries under consideration, because
stronger monetary barriers to trade reduce the desirability of separate national currencies.
The vertical intercepts on the left are positive because these economies would be better off
with independent monetary policies if trade frictions were absent; those on the right coincide
with the posterior means in Table 1.
21Changes in the exchange rate stabilisation coefficient leave the welfare gap unchanged up to the third
decimal digit, while changes in the international correlation of monetary shocks leave it unaffected up to the
fourth decimal digit.
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Figure 5: Trade frictions and the welfare gap between monetary regimes
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As the cost of asymmetric business cycles is small for these economies, moderate amounts
of monetary barriers to trade are enough for the benefits of a currency union to exceed
the costs. Table 2 reports the critical amounts of trade frictions that equate welfare across
monetary regimes for each pair of economies; they correspond to the horizontal intercepts of
the welfare gap lines in Figure 5. Particularly small frictions appear sufficient for a monetary
union between Italy and France, since their business cycles are quite correlated; larger frictions
seem to be needed to justify a monetary union between Spain and Germany, as they exhibit
more asynchronous disturbances and therefore have relatively more to gain from keeping
independent monetary policies.
Table 2: Trade frictions that equate welfare across regimes
Country pair Critical τ
Italy and France 0.09%
Italy and Germany 0.32%
Italy and Spain 0.14%
France and Germany 0.36%
France and Spain 0.15%
Spain and Germany 0.53%
The importance of the trade frictions is tied to the degree of openness of the two economies,
as represented by the weight of imported goods in consumption. The presence of home bias
reduces international trade and makes the effects of monetary barriers less severe; this lessens
the trade gains from monetary unification. Table 3 displays the results of welfare calculations
based on estimations with a moderate degree of home bias: preferences are calibrated with an
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imports share of ζ = 0.35 as in Erceg et al. (2009) and Coenen et al. (2009). The results are
qualitatively analogous to those in Table 1, with all countries experiencing higher welfare in a
currency union. Two quantitative differences stand out: first, the estimated welfare gains are
smaller than in the economy with no home bias; second, the figures vary more across country
pairs. This reflects the fact that the welfare gap lines in Figure 5 are now flatter and their
horizontal intercepts are more spaced out.
Table 3: Estimates of λ with home bias
Country pair Mean 90% HPD interval
Italy and France -1.73% [-1.75%, -1.71%]
Italy and Germany -1.09% [-1.32%, -0.95%]
Italy and Spain -1.61% [-1.75%, -1.46%]
France and Germany -1.14% [-1.32%, -0.95%]
France and Spain -1.48% [-1.59%, -1.32%]
Spain and Germany -0.92% [-1.15%, -0.76%]
5 Concluding remarks
What are the welfare implications of creating a currency union between different sovereign
nations? In this paper, I have revisited this question from the perspective of an open economy
DSGE model with asymmetric shocks and imperfect risk-sharing. I have emphasised one
specific dimension of the tradeoff between alternative monetary arrangements: the conflict
between the transactions and efficiency benefits of eliminating national currencies, on one
hand, and the costs of abandoning monetary policy independence in the face of asynchronous
business cycles, on the other.
Based on numerical work, I have argued that the introduction of a single currency would
be welfare-reducing in an economy with frictionless trade, because it would suppress an in-
strument of macroeconomic stabilisation and provide a second-order benefit (that of removing
price misalignments across markets). Once monetary barriers to trade are taken into account,
however, monetary unification becomes welfare-improving because it eliminates a friction that
has first-order effects on the economy.
Estimates from Italy, France, Germany and Spain suggest that these countries enjoy sub-
stantial welfare gains from sharing a common currency. The key to these findings is the fact
that the welfare cost of imperfectly synchronised business cycles is modest for these economies,
so the losses from missing country-specific instruments of monetary policy are easily exceeded
by the gains from trade creation.
My modelling strategy ignores a number of important issues in the macroeconomics of
monetary unions. It lacks an explicit description of financial intermediation and monetary
transmission, it misses taxation and government spending, and it overlooks labour market
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frictions and unemployment, just to name a few. The introduction of heterogeneity along
these dimensions is likely to have important consequences for macroeconomic adjustment and
social welfare in a currency union; it would be interesting to examine how they alter the
tradeoff between alternative monetary arrangements and affect the domain of applicability of
a single currency within the same type of framework presented here.
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Appendix
Notation
It is convenient to write the bond positions of the two households in real terms and express
them in their respective currencies:
at+1 ≡ At+1
pt
, bt+1 ≡ etBt+1
pt
, a∗t+1 ≡
A∗t+1
etp∗t
, b∗t+1 ≡
B∗t+1
p∗t
.
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It is also useful to define three sets of relative prices. First, the PPI-to-CPI ratios:
Ph,t ≡ ph,t
pt
, Pf,t ≡ pf,t
pt
, P∗h,t ≡
p∗h,t
p∗t
, P∗f,t ≡
p∗f,t
p∗t
.
Second, the optimal relative prices of each good in each currency:
p˜h,t ≡ p¯h,t
ph,t
, p˜∗h,t ≡
p¯∗h,t
p∗h,t
, p˜f,t ≡ p¯f,t
pf,t
, p˜∗f,t ≡
p¯∗f,t
p∗f,t
.
Third, the relative prices of foreign to domestic goods in each currency:
st ≡ pf,t
ph,t
, s∗t ≡
p∗f,t
p∗h,t
.
Consumption-based real wages in each country are
wt ≡ wt
pt
, w∗t ≡
w∗t
p∗t
.
Consumption-based real transfers are
tt ≡ Tt
pt
, t∗t ≡
T ∗t
p∗t
.
The depreciation of the nominal exchange rate is defined as
∆et ≡ et
et−1
.
This notation allows us to rewrite the optimality conditions and the market clearing conditions
in a format that is suitable for computation.
Equilibrium conditions
Relative prices:
Ph,t =
[
(1− ζ) + (ζ)
(
st
1− τ
)1−η] 1η−1
,
Pf,t =
[
(1− ζ)
( 1
st
)1−η
+ (ζ)
( 1
1− τ
)1−η] 1η−1
,
P∗h,t =
[
(1− ζ) (s∗t )1−η + (ζ)
( 1
1− τ
)1−η] 1η−1
,
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P∗f,t =
[
(1− ζ) + (ζ)
( 1
s∗t (1− τ)
)1−η] 1η−1
.
Consumption demands:
ch,t = (1− ζ) (Ph,t)−η ct,
cf,t = (ζ) (1− τ)η−1 (Pf,t)−η ct,
c∗f,t = (1− ζ)
(
P∗f,t
)−η
c∗t ,
c∗h,t = (ζ) (1− τ)η−1
(
P∗h,t
)−η
c∗t .
Market clearing conditions for goods:
yh,t = ch,t,
y∗h,t = (1− τ) c∗h,t + τc∗h,t,
yf,t = (1− τ) cf,t + τcf,t,
y∗f,t = c∗f,t,
yt = yh,t + y∗h,t,
y∗t = yf,t + y∗f,t.
Intertemporal optimisation:
λt = ξtc−σt ,
λt = ξtφt
nϕt
wt
,
qAt = βEt
(
λt+1
λt
1
pit+1
)
,
qBt (1− 2χ (bt+1))−1 = βEt
(
λt+1
λt
∆et+1
pit+1
)
,
ct + qAt at+1 + qBt bt+1 + χqBt (bt+1)2 =
at
pit
+ bt∆etpit
+ wtnt +Ph,tΠh,t + tt,
tt = QtχqAt
(
a∗t+1
)2
,
λ∗t = ξ∗t (c∗t )
−σ ,
λ∗t = ξ∗t φ∗t
(n∗t )ϕ
w∗t
,
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qAt
(
1− 2χ (a∗t+1))−1 = βEt
(
λ∗t+1
λ∗t
1
∆et+1pi∗t+1
)
,
qBt = βEt
(
λ∗t+1
λ∗t
1
pi∗t+1
)
,
c∗t + qAt a∗t+1 + qBt b∗t+1 + χqAt
(
a∗t+1
)2 = ∆et a∗t
pi∗t
+ b
∗
t
pi∗t
+ w∗tn∗t +P∗f,tΠf,t + t∗t ,
t∗t =
1
Qtχq
B
t (bt+1)2 .
Real exchange rate, relative prices and price misalignments:
Qt = mh,t
(1− ζ) (s∗t )1−η + (ζ)
(
1
1−τ
)1−η
(1− ζ) + (ζ)
(
st
1−τ
)1−η

1
1−η
,
mf,t
mh,t
= s
∗
t
st
,
mh,t
mh,t−1
= ∆et
pi∗h,t
pih,t
,
mf,t
mf,t−1
= ∆et
pi∗f,t
pif,t
.
Market clearing conditions for bonds:
at+1 = −a∗t+1Qt,
bt+1 = −b∗t+1Qt.
Output, marginal cost, price dispersion and aggregate profits:
yt =
ztnt
dt
,
y∗t =
z∗t n∗t
d∗t
,
mct =
wt
Ph,t
dt
zt
,
mc∗t =
w∗t
P∗f,t
d∗t
z∗t
,
dh,t = θp (pih,t)ε dh,t−1 + (1− θp) (p˜h,t)−ε ,
d∗h,t = θp
(
pi∗h,t
)ε
d∗h,t−1 + (1− θp)
(
p˜∗h,t
)−ε
,
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df,t = θp (pif,t)ε df,t−1 + (1− θp) (p˜f,t)−ε ,
d∗f,t = θp
(
pi∗f,t
)ε
d∗f,t−1 + (1− θp)
(
p˜∗f,t
)−ε
,
dt = xh,tdh,t + x∗h,td∗h,t,
d∗t = xf,tdf,t + x∗f,td∗f,t,
xh,t =
yh,t
yt
,
x∗h,t =
y∗h,t
yt
,
xf,t =
yf,t
y∗t
,
x∗f,t =
y∗f,t
y∗t
,
Πh,t = yh,t +mh,ty∗h,t −
wt
Ph,t
yt
zt
dt,
Πf,t = y∗f,t +
yf,t
mf,t
− w
∗
t
P∗f,t
y∗t
z∗t
d∗t .
Price dynamics, inflation and optimal price setting:
p˜h,t =
[
1− θp (pih,t)ε−1
1− θp
] 1
1−ε
,
p˜∗h,t =
1− θp
(
pi∗h,t
)ε−1
1− θp

1
1−ε
,
p˜f,t =
[
1− θp (pif,t)ε−1
1− θp
] 1
1−ε
,
p˜∗f,t =
1− θp
(
pi∗f,t
)ε−1
1− θp

1
1−ε
,
pih,t =
Ph,t
Ph,t−1
pit,
pi∗h,t =
P∗h,t
P∗h,t−1
pi∗t ,
pif,t =
Pf,t
Pf,t−1
pit,
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pi∗f,t =
P∗f,t
P∗f,t−1
pi∗t ,
g2h,t =Mpg1h,t,
g1h,t = yh,t
mct
dt
(p˜h,t)−1−ε + θpβEt
(
λt+1
λt
)(
p˜h,t
p˜h,t+1
)−1−ε
(pih,t+1)ε g1h,t+1,
g2h,t = yh,t (p˜h,t)−ε + θpβEt
(
λt+1
λt
)(
p˜h,t
p˜h,t+1
)−ε
(pih,t+1)ε−1 g2h,t+1,
g∗2h,t =Mpg∗1h,t,
g∗1h,t = y∗h,t
mct
dt
(
p˜∗h,t
)−1−ε
+ θpβEt
(
λt+1
λt
)( p˜∗h,t
p˜∗h,t+1
)−1−ε (
pi∗h,t+1
)ε
g∗1h,t+1,
g∗2h,t = mh,ty∗h,t
(
p˜∗h,t
)−ε
+ θpβEt
(
λt+1
λt
)( p˜∗h,t
p˜∗h,t+1
)−ε (
pi∗h,t+1
)ε−1
g∗2h,t+1,
g∗2f,t =Mpg∗1f,t,
g∗1f,t = y∗f,t
mc∗t
d∗t
(
p˜∗f,t
)−1−ε
+ θpβEt
(
λ∗t+1
λ∗t
)( p˜∗f,t
p˜∗f,t+1
)−1−ε (
pi∗f,t+1
)ε
g∗1f,t+1,
g∗2f,t = y∗f,t
(
p˜∗f,t
)−ε
+ θpβEt
(
λ∗t+1
λ∗t
)( p˜∗f,t
p˜∗f,t+1
)−ε (
pi∗f,t+1
)ε−1
g∗2f,t+1,
g2f,t =Mpg1f,t,
g1f,t = yf,t
mc∗t
d∗t
(p˜f,t)−1−ε + θpβEt
(
λ∗t+1
λ∗t
)(
p˜f,t
p˜f,t+1
)−1−ε
(pif,t+1)ε g1f,t+1,
g2f,t =
yf,t
mf,t
(p˜f,t)−ε + θpβEt
(
λ∗t+1
λ∗t
)(
p˜f,t
p˜f,t+1
)−ε
(pif,t+1)ε−1 g2f,t+1,
Mp = ε
ε− 1 .
Interest rates and monetary policy with national currencies:
Rt =
1
qAt
,
R∗t =
1
qBt
,
Rt
pi/β
=
(
Rt−1
pi/β
)γR [(pit
pi
)γpi ( yt
yt−1
)γy
(∆et)γe
]1−γR
mt,
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R∗t
pi∗/β
=
(
R∗t−1
pi∗/β
)γR [(pi∗t
pi∗
)γpi ( y∗t
y∗t−1
)γy ( 1
∆et
)γe]1−γR
m∗t .
Interest rates and monetary policy with a single currency:
Rut
piu/β
=
(
Rut−1
piu/β
)γR [(piu,t
piu
)γpi ( yu,t
yu,t−1
)γy]1−γR
mut ,
piu,t = (pih,t)
1
2 (pif,t)
1
2 ,
yu,t = yt + y∗t ,
Rt = Rut
(
pih,t
piu,t
)ω
,
R∗t = Rut
(
pif,t
piu,t
)ω
.
Exogenous processes:
log ξt = ρξ log ξt−1 + νξ log ξ∗t−1 + eξ,t,
log ξ∗t = ρξ log ξ∗t−1 + νξ log ξt−1 + e∗ξ,t,
log φt = ρφ log φt−1 + νφ log φ∗t−1 + eφ,t,
log φ∗t = ρφ log φ∗t−1 + νφ log φt−1 + e∗φ,t,
log zt = ρz log zt−1 + νz log z∗t−1 + ez,t,
log z∗t = ρz log z∗t−1 + νz log zt−1 + e∗z,t,
logmt = ρm logmt−1 + νm logm∗t−1 + em,t,
logm∗t = ρm logm∗t−1 + νm logmt−1 + e∗m,t,
logmut = ρm logmut−1 + eum,t.
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Calibration for Section 3.6
Table 4: Calibration
Parameter Value Description
σ 1 Elasticity of intertemporal substitution
ϕ 1 Frisch elasticity of labour supply
ε 6 Elasticity of substitution between intermediates
ζ 0.5 Share of imports in consumption
η 1 Armington elasticity of substitution
β 0.99 Subjective discount factor
χ 0.005 Bond holdings adjustment cost
θp 0.66 Price stickiness parameter
τ 0 Trade cost parameter
γR 0 Interest rate smoothing parameter in the Taylor rule
γpi 1.5 Inflation parameter in the Taylor rule
γy 0 Output parameter in the Taylor rule
γe 1.5 Exchange rate parameter in the Taylor rule
ω 0.001 Elasticity of interest rates to inflation differentials
σez 0.01 Standard deviation of productivity shocks
σem 0 Standard deviation of monetary shocks
σeξ 0 Standard deviation of preference shocks
σeφ 0 Standard deviation of labour supply shocks
ρz 0.95 Serial correlation of productivity shocks
ρm 0.95 Serial correlation of monetary shocks
ρξ 0.95 Serial correlation of preference shocks
ρφ 0.95 Serial correlation of labour supply shocks
νz 0 International spillover of productivity shocks
νm 0 International spillover of monetary shocks
νξ 0 International spillover of preference shocks
νφ 0 International spillover of labour supply shocks
corr (ez, e∗z) 0 International correlation of productivity shocks
corr (em, e∗m) 0 International correlation of monetary shocks
corr
(
eξ, e
∗
ξ
)
0 International correlation of preference shocks
corr
(
eφ, e
∗
φ
)
0 International correlation of labour supply shocks
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Estimation: Tables and Figures
Table 5: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Description Value
σ Elasticity of intertemporal substitution 1
ϕ Frisch elasticity of labour supply 1
ε Elasticity of substitution between intermediates 6
ζ Share of imports in consumption 0.5
η Armington elasticity of substitution 1
β Subjective discount factor 0.99
χ Bond holdings adjustment cost 0.005
θp Price stickiness parameter 0.66
ω Elasticity of interest rates to inflation differentials 0.001
νz International spillover of productivity shocks 0
νm International spillover of monetary shocks 0
νξ International spillover of preference shocks 0
νφ International spillover of labour supply shocks 0
τ Trade cost parameter 0.05
corr (em, e∗m) International correlation of monetary shocks 0
γe Exchange rate parameter in the Taylor rule 3
Table 6: Prior distributions
Parameter Description Prior distribution (µ, σ)
γR Interest rate smoothing parameter in the Taylor rule Normal (0, 0.25)
γpi Inflation parameter in the Taylor rule Normal (1.5, 0.25)
γy Output parameter in the Taylor rule Normal (0.5, 0.25)
σez Standard deviation of home productivity shocks Gamma (0.05, 0.025)
σe∗z Standard deviation of foreign productivity shocks Gamma (0.05, 0.025)
σeum Standard deviation of monetary shocks Gamma (0.05, 0.025)
σeξ Standard deviation of home preference shocks Gamma (0.05, 0.025)
σe∗
ξ
Standard deviation of foreign preference shocks Gamma (0.05, 0.025)
σeφ Standard deviation of home labour supply shocks Gamma (0.05, 0.025)
σe∗
φ
Standard deviation of foreign labour supply shocks Gamma (0.05, 0.025)
ρz Serial correlation of productivity shocks Beta (0.5, 0.15)
ρm Serial correlation of monetary shocks Beta (0.5, 0.15)
ρξ Serial correlation of preference shocks Beta (0.5, 0.15)
ρφ Serial correlation of labour supply shocks Beta (0.5, 0.15)
corr (ez, e∗z) International correlation of productivity shocks Normal (0, 0.25)
corr
(
eξ, e
∗
ξ
)
International correlation of preference shocks Normal (0, 0.25)
corr
(
eφ, e
∗
φ
)
International correlation of labour supply shocks Normal (0, 0.25)
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Table 9: Unconditional variance decompositions: Italy and France
Variable Shock
ez e
∗
z eξ e
∗
ξ eφ e
∗
φ e
u
m
yt 86.95% 0.52% 5.61% 0.67% 2.62% 0.05% 3.57%
y∗t 4.66% 66.47% 16.08% 7.86% 0.60% 1.26% 3.06%
ct 40.64% 29.94% 16.69% 5.10% 1.92% 0.66% 5.06%
c∗t 41.75% 30.90% 14.32% 5.18% 2.04% 0.71% 5.11%
pit 0.19% 0.04% 0.08% 0.39% 0.06% 0.01% 99.24%
pi∗t 1.09% 1.61% 15.86% 11.63% 0.10% 0.27% 69.44%
Rut 0.83% 0.36% 1.00% 1.84% 0.30% 0.04% 95.63%
Table 10: Unconditional variance decompositions: Italy and Germany
Variable Shock
ez e
∗
z eξ e
∗
ξ eφ e
∗
φ e
u
m
yt 95.73% 0.16% 0.00% 0.00% 0.08% 0.00% 4.03%
y∗t 6.38% 89.40% 0.00% 0.00% 0.08% 0.00% 4.14%
ct 36.74% 53.63% 0.00% 0.00% 0.18% 0.00% 9.44%
c∗t 36.93% 53.52% 0.00% 0.00% 0.18% 0.00% 9.36%
pit 0.06% 0.01% 0.03% 0.00% 0.03% 0.00% 99.86%
pi∗t 1.00% 0.74% 0.29% 0.08% 0.07% 0.11% 97.72%
Rut 0.13% 0.08% 0.26% 0.00% 0.06% 0.00% 99.47%
Table 11: Unconditional variance decompositions: Italy and Spain
Variable Shock
ez e
∗
z eξ e
∗
ξ eφ e
∗
φ e
u
m
yt 96.73% 0.10% 0.00% 0.00% 0.06% 0.00% 3.11%
y∗t 1.11% 95.67% 0.00% 0.00% 0.05% 0.00% 3.16%
ct 48.71% 45.37% 0.00% 0.00% 0.11% 0.00% 5.82%
c∗t 48.65% 45.45% 0.00% 0.00% 0.11% 0.00% 5.79%
pit 0.06% 0.01% 0.03% 0.00% 0.03% 0.00% 99.97%
pi∗t 0.51% 0.79% 0.20% 0.07% 0.03% 0.11% 98.29%
Rut 0.05% 0.07% 0.23% 0.00% 0.04% 0.00% 99.60%
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Table 12: Unconditional variance decompositions: France and Germany
Variable Shock
ez e
∗
z eξ e
∗
ξ eφ e
∗
φ e
u
m
yt 94.29% 0.11% 0.00% 0.00% 0.05% 0.00% 5.54%
y∗t 6.13% 88.18% 0.01% 0.00% 0.05% 0.00% 5.64%
ct 34.57% 52.51% 0.00% 0.00% 0.11% 0.00% 12.80%
c∗t 34.71% 52.45% 0.01% 0.00% 0.11% 0.00% 12.72%
pit 0.10% 0.03% 0.07% 0.00% 0.06% 0.00% 99.74%
pi∗t 1.78% 1.27% 0.61% 0.16% 0.12% 0.20% 95.86%
Rut 0.28% 0.19% 0.81% 0.00% 0.13% 0.00% 98.59%
Table 13: Unconditional variance decompositions: France and Spain
Variable Shock
ez e
∗
z eξ e
∗
ξ eφ e
∗
φ e
u
m
yt 95.82% 0.08% 0.00% 0.00% 0.04% 0.00% 4.07%
y∗t 0.80% 95.04% 0.00% 0.00% 0.04% 0.00% 4.12%
ct 47.40% 44.95% 0.00% 0.00% 0.07% 0.00% 7.57%
c∗t 47.36% 45.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.07% 0.00% 7.55%
pit 0.14% 0.02% 0.08% 0.00% 0.07% 0.00% 99.68%
pi∗t 1.13% 1.77% 0.52% 0.19% 0.06% 0.02% 96.08%
Rut 0.15% 0.24% 0.93% 0.00% 0.12% 0.00% 98.57%
Table 14: Unconditional variance decompositions: Spain and Germany
Variable Shock
ez e
∗
z eξ e
∗
ξ eφ e
∗
φ e
u
m
yt 83.51% 0.07% 0.01% 0.00% 0.03% 0.00% 16.38%
y∗t 5.29% 78.07% 0.01% 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 16.61%
ct 26.41% 40.93% 0.02% 0.00% 0.06% 0.00% 32.58%
c∗t 26.49% 40.96% 0.02% 0.00% 0.06% 0.00% 32.47%
pit 0.12% 0.02% 0.09% 0.00% 0.06% 0.00% 99.71%
pi∗t 1.32% 1.16% 0.60% 0.14% 0.10% 0.16% 96.52%
Rut 0.32% 0.31% 2.36% 0.00% 0.12% 0.00% 96.89%
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